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I. INTRODUCTION
In March of 2020, under the pretext of protecting public
health, the Trump administration closed the border to asylum
seekers, 1 a policy referred to as “Title 42,” which the Biden
administration has continued. 2 Those who arrive at the border
fleeing persecution are either returned to Mexico—if they are
among the nationalities Mexico has agreed to accept3—or they are
deported directly to the countries they fled. Leading international
law scholars have decried this policy as a clear violation of the
United States’ legal obligation, undertaken when it became a party
to the 1967 Refugee Protocol,4 not to “expel or return” individuals
1. Q&A: US Title 42 Policy to Expel Migrants at the Border, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 8,
2021), https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/08/qa-us-title-42-policy-expel-migrantsborder?gclid=CjwKCAiA4KaRBhBdEiwAZi1zzjzdUJIyJwyllCkVrBsVizaY7jgj8lgT56HWgxFaIsIFFONZGfA3RoCBVcQAvD_BwE
[https://perma.cc/4GXU-AEWC].
2. Fact Sheet: A Guide to Title 42 Expulsions at the Border, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Oct.
15, 2021). On April 1, 2022 the Biden administration announced that it would terminate
the use of Title 42, effective May 23. Mike LaSusa, Pandemic Order Speeding Migrant
Removals to End in May, LAW360 (Apr. 1, 2022) https://www-law360com.uchastings.idm.oclc.org/articles/1480088/pandemic-order-speeding-migrantremovals-to-end-in-may [https://perma.cc/2KNX-WELH]. The states of Louisiana,
Missouri, and Arizona sued to block the termination, and were subsequently joined by
twenty other states. On April 27, Judge Summerhays, a Trump appointee, issued a
temporary order in the states’ favor, prohibiting the Biden administration from taking any
action to phase out Title 42 prior to the May 23 date. Camilo Montoya-Galvez, Judge Blocks
U.S. Border Officials from Winding Down Title 42 Expulsion Policy, CBS NEWS (Apr. 27, 2022)
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/title-42-immigration-judge-blocks-border-officialsmay-23/ [https://perma.cc/9URC-VN8Y]. The court’s ruling did not rule on the ultimate
issue of the policy’s termination. Miriam Jordan & Eileen Sullivan, Judge Says Migrants Must
Still Be Denied Entry for Health Reasons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2022)
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/25/us/title-42-migrants-biden-border.html
[https://perma.cc/62PN-8P52].
3. See id. Under an agreement reached with the Mexican government in late March
2020, the Border Patrol began sending most Mexican, Guatemalan, Honduran, and
Salvadoran families and single adults to Mexico. Despite this agreement, there has been
extensive documentation of individuals expelled to Mexico who do not fit within this
category, including Haitian asylum seekers. People expelled are usually driven by bus to
the nearest port of entry and told to walk back to Mexico, often without their luggage and
other belongings. Id.; see also Q&A: US Title 42 Policy to Expel Migrants at the Border, supra
note 1.
4. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Refugee Protocol]. The United States became a party to the
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fleeing persecution 5 —a view most recently articulated in a
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.6
Although the Title 42 border closure is unprecedented, it is by
no means the first time that the United States attempted to
circumvent its non-refoulement obligations. In fact, it did so within
a year of enacting the 1980 Refugee Act in execution of its treaty
obligations,7 when President Ronald Reagan implemented a policy
designed to prevent Haitian asylum seekers from ever reaching the
United States where they would be able to seek protection.8
The United States is not an outlier among wealthy countries
in adopting policies which directly or constructively flout the
prohibition on refoulement, or otherwise attempt to negate
protection obligations. Deploying strategies referred to as the
“externalization of migration controls,” these countries have
increasingly taken actions which prevent asylum seekers from

Refugee Protocol on November 1, 1968. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, STATES PARTIES TO
1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL (Apr.
2015),
https://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GD9N-RVVM].
5. Memorandum from Harold Hongju Koh, Former Senior Legal Adviser of the U.S.
Dep’t of State (Oct. 2, 2021), https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000017c-4c4a-dddc-a77e4ddbf3ae0000 [https://perma.cc/2B9C-AUA4] (last accessed Mar. 9, 2022) [hereinafter
“Koh Memo”]; Refugee Protocol, supra note 4, art. 1.
6. Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas, 27 F.4th 718 (D.C. Cir. 2022). In Huisha-Huisha, a
group of asylum-seeking families challenged Title 42 as a violation of the Immigration and
Nationality Act and the legal right to assert claims for asylum and related forms of
humanitarian relief. After back and forth appeals by plaintiffs and the government, the D.C.
Circuit upheld, in part, the district court’s preliminary injunction, holding that the
government cannot expel asylum-seeking families to places where they would be
persecuted or tortured. See id.; Title 42 Challenges, CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD.,
https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/title-42-challenges
[https://perma.cc/3Q98YSBE] (last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
7. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); David A. Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: A Forlorn
BLOG
(Mar.
19,
2020,
2:30
PM),
Anniversary,
LAWFARE
https://www.lawfareblog.com/refugee-act-1980-forlorn-anniversary
[https://perma.cc/6NAS-44VC]. See also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37
(1987) (“If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of ‘refugee,’
and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring
the United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, to which the United
States acceded in 1968.”).
8. See infra notes 24 to 29 and supporting text for discussion.
THE
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accessing their territories or render them inadmissible without
considering their claims.9
The externalization of migration controls is on full display in
Australia and countries of the European Union, and is a practice
that the United States adopted wholesale during the Trump
administration.10 As noted by one scholar, “States, while giving lip
service to the obligations enshrined in the 1951 Convention,
have . . . sought to limit the possibility of individuals to benefit from
the rights to which they agreed some 50 years ago.” 11 Policies
designed to deny protection have become so commonplace that for
many observers, they are not seen as the repudiation of treaty
obligations which they are.
This Article is an unapologetic call to resist the normalization
of practices so deeply at odds with the letter and spirit of the
international refugee protection regime. This appeal rests not only
on legal obligations, but on moral and ethical considerations which
undergird the juridical norms and prohibit denying entry to the
stranger when it would cause him or her grave harm.12 A call to
moral and ethical considerations carries particular valence where
the potential country of refuge contributed to the conditions
leading to flight, and the need for protection.
Part II of this Article describes the origins and scope of our
international refugee system, followed by an overview of the
policies which circumvent or undermine protection—focusing on
the United States, Australia, and the European Union. Part III
articulates the moral and ethical arguments for the admission of
those seeking protection. Finally, in Part IV, using the example of
the United States’ role of intervention in Haiti, Guatemala, El
Salvador, and Honduras, I will lay out the argument for an even
greater responsibility where history reveals the moral debt owed
by the country of refuge to those fleeing persecution.
9. Bill Frelick et al., The Impact of the Externalization of Migration Controls on the
Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other Migrants, 4 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 190, 193 (2016).
10. A full discussion of all the policies of externalization undertaken by the Trump
administration is beyond the scope of this Article, but for a good overview, see Lindsay
Harris, Asylum Under Attack, 67 LOY. L. REV. 121, 130-60 (2021).
11. Jean Allain, The jus cogens Nature of non-refoulement, 13 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 533,
533 (2001).
12 . Rebecca Sharpless, Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Detention of Immigrant
Families, 47 N.M. L. REV. 19, 27 (2017).
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE PROTECTION REGIME AND
STATE VIOLATION OR AVOIDANCE OF OBLIGATIONS
A. The International Refugee Protection Regime
The 1951 Refugee Convention13 and its 1967 Protocol14 are
the foundational documents for our contemporary international
refugee protection regime. They have been ratified by the vast
majority of nation states. 15 Art. 1 of the Convention defines a
refugee as an individual with a “well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion[.]” States are
encouraged but not required to provide a durable status to
individuals who meet the refugee definition. 16 Although state
parties are not required to extend permanent status, neither may
they return refugees to harm.17 The obligation of non-refoulement
is clearly set forth in Art. 33.1:
No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.18

The principle of non-refoulement has been referred to as the
“most essential component” of refugee protection, 19 has been
incorporated into many other international and regional
instruments, 20 and is considered to have attained the status of
13. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention].
14. Refugee Protocol, supra note 4.
15. As of the end of 2020, 149 nations were parties to either the Convention, the
Protocol, or both, while forty-four nations were not. See Maja Janmyr, The 1951 Refugee
Convention and Non-Signatory States: Charting a Research Agenda, 33 INT’L J. REFUGEE L.
188, 188-89 (2021).
16. Art. 34 provides: “The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the
assimilation and naturalization of refugees.” 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 13, art.
34.
17. UNHCR has advised that formal recognition as a “refugee” is not required for nonrefoulement to apply. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, NOTE ON NON-REFOULEMENT, ¶ 15,
U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/2 (Aug. 23, 1977) [hereinafter UNHCR Note on Non-Refoulement].
18. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 13, art. 33, ¶ 1.
19. UNHCR Note on Non-Refoulement, supra note 17, ¶ 1.
20. Id. ¶ 2.
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customary international law.21 Some scholars argue that it is a jus
cogens norm, from which no derogation is permitted.22
B. State Violation or Avoidance of Obligations
The United States, Australia, and the countries of the
European Union are illustrative of the range of strategies that
wealthy, industrialized nations have adopted in violation or
avoidance of their protection obligations under the Convention
and Protocol. Among other exclusionary practices, the United
States has openly violated the norm of non-refoulement by directly
returning asylum seekers to the countries from which they fled.
Australia and the European Union have focused on limiting or
denying access to their territory, thereby preventing asylum
seekers from ever claiming protection. Although these policies do
not directly return an individual to the country of persecution, they
often give rise to refoulement when inadequate protections exist
in the country to which they are sent.23
1. The United States
The United States became a party to the 1967 Refugee
Protocol in 1968 and executed its treaty obligations by passing the
1980 Refugee Act. The Refugee Act adopted the international

21. Alice Farmer, Non-Refoulement and Jus Cogens: Limiting Anti-Terror Measures
that Threaten Refugee Protection, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 8 (2008).
22. See generally Allain, supra note 11.
23. Frelick et al, supra note 9, at 198-99.
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refugee definition,24 as well as the prohibition on refoulement. 25
No sooner had the law passed than President Reagan put in motion
a plan to prevent Haitians from seeking the protection provided by
the law. The Reagan administration entered into an agreement
with Haitian dictator, Jean-Claude Duvalier, 26 which gave the US
Coast Guard the authority to stop Haitian vessels in international
waters, and to “return undocumented passengers to Haiti.”27
In order to maintain the fiction that the United States was not
violating its obligations under both the Refugee Protocol and
Refugee Act, Reagan issued an Executive Order providing that “no
person who is a refugee will be returned without his consent.”28
This was to be accomplished by Coast Guard screening to identify
those with viable claims. However, the number of Haitians allowed
to seek asylum shows the screening to be a sham. From 1981 to
1990, a time of high human rights violations, political repression,
and persecution in Haiti, 21,455 Haitians were stopped by the
24 . Compare Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–212, 94 Stat. 102; 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42) (“The term ‘refugee’ means … any person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country
in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to,
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”) with 1951
Refugee Convention, supra note 13 (“…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events,
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”).
25. “[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney
General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country
because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); see also withholding of removal under
section 241(b)(3)(B) of the Act and withholding of removal under the Convention Against
Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16 (2021).
26. Stephanie Hanes, Jean-Claude Duvalier, ex-Haitian Leader Known as Baby Doc,
POST
(Oct.
4,
2014),
Dies
at
63,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/jean-claude-duvalier-exhaitian-leader-known-as-baby-doc-dies-at-63/2014/10/04/ecdaa2bc-4be3-11e4-b72ed60a9229cc10_story.html [https://perma.cc/65LM-MFA8].
27. Cheryl Little, United States Haitian Policy: A History of Discrimination, 10 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 269, 295–96 (1993); KAREN MUSALO ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: AN
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE APPROACH 106–07 (5th ed. 2018).
28. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109, § 2(c)(3) (Sept. 29, 1981).
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Coast Guard and returned, and only six were permitted to come to
the United States to pursue their claims for protection.29
The George H.W. Bush administration abandoned the pretext
of compliance with the norm of non-refoulement. The bloody
September 1991 coup which overthrew Jean Bertrand Aristide, the
first democratically elected president of Haiti, led to a growing
exodus of Haitians fleeing the island nation. Rather than allow
them to step foot on US soil, where they could apply for protection,
the Coast Guard returned them to Haiti without any screening.30
Then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton denounced the policy
in the strongest possible terms31 and then adopted it when he was
elected. The Haitian Centers Council challenged the policy of
interdiction and return as a violation of non-refoulement provided
for in both the Refugee Act, and the Protocol. In a 1993 Supreme
Court decision referred to as “eccentric and highly implausible”32
by one of the Protocol’s drafters, the Court held that the policy
violated neither domestic law nor treaty obligations. 33
Recent policies demonstrate the United States’ ongoing
willingness to breach the prohibition on refoulement, with Title 42
being a clear example. Asylum seekers subject to Title 42 are either
sent over the border to Mexico, where they are likely to suffer
grievous human rights violations, or put on planes and directly
returned to their home countries. 34 Although Title 42’s border
29. Karen Musalo, El Salvador: Root Causes and Just Asylum Policy Responses, HASTINGS
RACE & POVERTY L.J. 178, 230 n.281 (2021), [hereinafter Musalo, El Salvador: Root Causes].
30. See Julie Ann Waterman, The United States’ Involvement in Haiti’s Tragedy and the
Resolve to Restore Democracy, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 187 (1994).
31. Clinton declared:
I am appalled by the decision of the Bush Administration to pick up fleeing
Haitians on the high seas and forcibly return them to Haiti before considering
their claim to political asylum . . . This process must not stand. It is a blow to the
principle of first asylum and to America’s moral authority in defending the rights
of refugees around the world.
Bill Frelick, Haitian Boat Interdiction and Return: First Asylum and First Principles of
Refugee Protection, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 675, 688 n.65 (1993), (citing Clinton Continues
Summary Return of Haitians: U.S. Lawyers Investigate In-Country Processing, REFUGEE REP.,
Jan. 29, 1993, at 1-2).
32. Louis Henkin, Notes from the President, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. NEWSL. (Sept.-Oct. 1993)
reprinted in KAREN MUSALO ET AL., supra note 27, at 142.
33. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 159 (1993).
34. See Delivered to Danger: U.S. Government Sending Asylum Seekers and Migrants to
RTS.
FIRST
(Feb.
19,
2021),
Danger,
HUM.
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closure had been in place since March 2020, it was the mass
expulsion of Haitian asylum seekers in the fall of 2021 that drew
public attention, and garnered explicit condemnations of the
returns as acts of refoulement.35
2. Australia
Australia is a party to the Refugee Convention and Protocol.
Over the past two decades, however, it has revised its laws and
policies in ever-harsher ways to prevent asylum seekers from
accessing its territory and claiming refugee protection. One of the
most telling aspects of Australia’s relationship to its treaty
obligations is that in 2014 it removed most references to the
Refugee Convention in its Migration Act.36
The inception of harsh and exclusionary policies is often dated
back to August 2001 when a Norwegian freighter, the Tampa,
rescued a sinking ship of ailing asylum seekers and was denied
permission to land at the Australian territory of Christmas Island.37
After a long standoff, during which Australia would not back down,
New Zealand and Nauru agreed to accept the passengers for
asylum processing.
After the Tampa incident, Australia established a naval barrier
to prevent asylum seekers from entering its territorial waters—a

https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/campaign/remain-mexico [https://perma.cc/6SGASVTT]; Human Rights Travesty: Biden Administration Embrace of Trump Asylum Expulsion
Policy Endangers Lives, Wreaks Havoc, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Aug. 24, 2021),
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/human-rights-travesty-bidenadministration-embrace-trump-asylum-expulsion-policy-endangers
[https://perma.cc/SJ97-J73R]; A Guide to Title 42 Expulsions at the Border, AM. IMMIGR.
COUNCIL (Oct. 2021), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/guidetitle-42-expulsions-border [https://perma.cc/N9KE-E78L].
35 . See Koh Memo, supra note 5. See also Press Release, U.N. High Comm’r for
Refugees, News Comment by UN High Commission for Refugees Filippo Grandi on
Conditions and Expulsions at US border (Sept. 21, 2021), https://www.unhcr.org/enus/news/press/2021/9/614a27324/news-comment-un-high-commissioner-refugeesfilippo-grandi-conditions-expulsions.html
[https://perma.cc/99UZ-4T9L]
(“The
summary, mass expulsions of individuals currently under way under the Title 42 authority,
without screening for protection needs, is inconsistent with international norms and may
constitute refoulement.”).
36. Frelick et al., supra note 9, at 205.
37. Tara Magner, A Less than ‘Pacific’ Solution for Asylum Seekers in Australia, 16 INT’L
J. REFUGEE L. 53, 54 (2003).
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policy dubbed the “Pacific Solution.”38 It has since broadened the
Pacific Solution, engaging in joint activities with Indonesia, Sri
Lanka, and Malaysia to deter asylum seekers.39 To ensure its ability
to refuse protection to asylum seekers, the Australian Parliament
enacted legislation excising Christmas Island and other of the
country’s outer territories from its immigration law. Australia
transfers any migrants who arrive on its territory or who are
interdicted at sea to other countries for asylum processing and
refuses to resettle any of them.40
3. The European Union
In March 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led to the flight of
three million refugees within the first few weeks of the war. The
actions and statements by EU countries and their populace have
been welcoming.41 Ukrainian refugees have been permitted entry
with no documentation requirements and provided with free
transit and phone communication, while volunteers have gathered
to distribute necessities, such as food and medicine. 42 Most
importantly, the EU Council activated for the first time its 2001
Temporary Protection Directive giving Ukrainians immediate
protection for a minimum of one year, as well as the right to live
and receive benefits in the EU country of their choice.43
The European Union’s response to Ukrainians is a model to be
emulated, but it stands in stark contrast to its policies over the
38. Id. at 56.
39. Frelick et al., supra note 9, at 205.
40. This practice in Australia is commonly referred to as “offshore processing.” See
Offshore Processing: An Overview, KALDOR CTR. FOR INT’L REFUGEE L. (Aug. 10, 2021),
https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/offshore-processing-overview
[https://perma.cc/VZ6Q-MPQS]; Australia: 8 Years of Abusive Offshore Asylum Processing,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 15, 2021), https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/15/australia-8years-abusive-offshore-asylum-processing# [https://perma.cc/KU3J-WRXM].
41. Press Release, The Glob. Detention Project, The Ukraine Crisis Double Standards:
Has
Europe’s
Response
to
Refugees
Changed?
(Mar.
2,
2022),
https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-crisis-double-standards-has-europe-sresponse-refugees-changed [https://perma.cc/2BKD-J7Y4].
42. Id.
43. Elena Chachko & Katerina Linos, Sharing Responsibility for Ukrainian Refugees:
BLOG
(Mar.
5,
2022),
An
Unprecedented
Response,
LAWFARE
https://www.lawfareblog.com/sharing-responsibility-ukrainian-refugeesunprecedented-response [https://perma.cc/SCK5-3MKL].
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years which deny refugees access to the EU and outsource its
protection obligations. When there was a mass influx of Syrian
refugees, beginning in 2015, Hungary, Croatia, and Slovenia
attempted to close their borders, and the member states of the EU
rejected a European Commission proposal for burden sharing. 44
The EU then negotiated an agreement with Turkey to accept all of
the Syrian refugees who had arrived in Greece by transiting
Turkey.
The deal with Turkey—which broadly falls within the
category of a “readmission” agreement since the migrants
transited Turkey—has been employed by the EU with other
countries. 45 In addition to such agreements, another strategy
intended to keep refugees off EU soil includes “push-backs” at sea,
most notably in the Mediterranean, which is the route often taken
by asylum seekers from Sub-Saharan African countries.46
As a consequence of its geographic location, Italy was deeply
engaged in these pushbacks. When a decision by the European
Court of Human Rights ruled that its interception and repatriation
of migrants at sea violated the European Convention of Human
Rights, 47 it responded by financing Libya to do what it was not

44. See Rick Lyman, Hungary Seals Border With Croatia in Migrant Crackdown, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/17/world/europe/hungarycroatia-refugees-migrants.html [https://perma.cc/6K58-NB98]; Aleksandar Vasovic
& Marja Novak, Croatia Diverts Migrants to Slovenia After Hungary Closes Border, REUTERS
(Oct. 17, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-sloveniaidUSKCN0SB06620151017 [https://perma.cc/E7RY-L5S4]; Sarah Almukhtar et al.,
Closing the Back Door to Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2015). See also Council Decision 1601,
2015 O.J. (L 248) 280 (EU) (establishing provisional measures in the area of international
protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, including support for burden sharing policies
and mandatory quotas). Council Decision 1601 was replaced with 1754 a year later after
pushback against a mandatory resettlement policy, in favor of a “voluntary arrangement”
by EU member states. Council Decision 1754, 2016 O.J. (L 268) 82, ¶ 4 (EU). For further
information regarding pushback against EU “burden-sharing” provisions, see Frelick et al.,
supra note 9, at 197 n.17, 206-08 (explaining the problem of “burden sharing” and
discussing the failure of EU-wide agreements to address 2015 migrant crisis).
45. Frelick et al., supra note 9, at 206-07.
46 . AZADEH ERFANI & MARIA GARCIA, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., PUSHING BACK
PROTECTION 20-21 (2021), https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/contenttype/research-item/documents/2021-08/Offshoring-Asylum-Report_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3ASM-CY26] [hereinafter NIJC, PUSHING BACK PROTECTION].
47. Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, ¶¶ 156-58 (Feb. 23, 2012),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109231 [https://perma.cc/6ZUU-L6CD]. The Court
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permitted to do. Under a formal agreement, Italy and the EU
provide training and resources, which fund the Libyan Coast Guard
to prevent migrants from arriving in any EU member state. The
Coast Guard takes intercepted migrants to Libya where they have
been subject to indefinite detention, torture, and slavery.48
Equally egregious to the pushbacks is the failure of EU
member states to rescue unseaworthy vessels of migrants, while
criminalizing non-governmental organizations carrying out search
and rescue missions. 49 Between 2014 and 2021, twenty-two
thousand migrants died in the Mediterranean and Atlantic while
attempting to reach Europe. 50 In 2021, the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights issued a report condemning the
EU member states for pushbacks and failure to rescue migrants at
sea.51
III. THE MORAL AND ETHICAL DIMENSION OF MIGRATION POLICY
A number of the policies described above plainly violate the
legal obligation of non-refoulement; among them would be the
direct return of Haitians to their home country. 52 Other policies
may not constitute such a clear violation, but nonetheless are
contrary to the overarching humanitarian objectives of the
Convention and its Protocol. Building fences and walls, as well as
establishing naval blockades to keep asylum seekers out, subvert
the treaty’s object and purpose—even if not rising to the level of
actual “violations.”
But we should not assess the actions of nation states solely by
reference to legal obligations. As political theorists and
philosophers,53 as well as faith-based leaders54 have posited, there
held that Italy’s actions violated the prohibition of collective expulsion under Art. 4
Protocol 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights.
48. NIJC, PUSHING BACK PROTECTION, supra note 46, at 20-21.
49. Id. at 22.
50. Id. at 21.
51. Id. at 22.
52. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
54. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all express a broad obligation to offer a safe
haven to the oppressed. A little-known historical fact is that Convention Article 33 was
drafted by Rabbi Isaac Lewin who, addressing the UN Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness
in 1950, cited Bible precedent in arguing for the legal prohibition against sending someone
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are moral and ethical considerations that should also inform issues
of migration in general, and refugee protection specifically. In
other words, even if a country has the sovereign right to close its
borders, and exclude non-citizens, it may not be the moral or
ethical thing to do.
Among those who have questioned the “morality of territorial
boundaries” 55 are philosophers John Rawls and Joseph Carens. 56
They pointed to the vast differences in “wealth and power”
between nations.57 Rawls and Carens argued that the “inequality of
opportunity that flows from the mere fact of one’s place of birth is
arbitrary and unjustifiable.”58
In her eloquently written 2017 article, Professor Rebecca
Sharpless connects the perspectives of philosophers such as Rawls
and Carens with the democratic political theory of
“cosmopolitanism.” The central beliefs of this theory are that “each
person is of equal worth” and that “a person’s life opportunities
should not be dictated by where she was born.”59 Cosmopolitanism

into danger. See Gilad Ben-Nun, How Jewish is International Law?, 23 J. HIST. INT’L L. 249,
258-60 (Dec. 4, 2020). Pope Francis has repeatedly invoked the Biblical mandate to
welcome the stranger, expressing his “particular concern for the lamentable situation of
many migrants and refugees fleeing from war, persecution, natural disasters and poverty.”
Pope Francis, Message of His Holiness Pope Francis for the 104th World Day of Migrants
and
Refugees
2018
(Jan.
14,
2018),
https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/messages/migration/documents/papafrancesco_20170815_world-migrants-day-2018.html [https://perma.cc/Y995-W23X]. In
his 2018 message, Pope Francis expressly called for policies which offer “broader options
for migrants and refugees to enter destination countries safely and legally.” Id. Islam also
calls for the protection of vulnerable individuals, and “[a]ccording to Islamic migration law
(hijrah) individuals have the right both to seek and be granted asylum in any Muslim state,”
and “it is the duty of Muslims to accept and protect refugees for as long as they seek
protection.” U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, HIGH COMMISSIONER’S DIALOGUE ON PROTECTION
CHALLENGES, ISLAM AND REFUGEES, ¶ 1 (Nov. 20, 2012), https://www.unhcr.org/enus/protection/hcdialogue%20/50ab90399/islam-refugees.html
[https://perma.cc/627R-RXZA]. Asylum is “an integral part of the islamic [sic] conception
of human rights.” Id. ¶ 2.
55. Sharpless, supra note 12, at 28.
56. Rawls and Carens are by no means the only ones who have made these and
similar arguments. Sharpless references others such as Phillip Cole, Teresa Hayter,
Satvinder Singh Joss, Thomas Christiano, and Chandran Kukathas. See id. at 28 n.55.
57. Myron Weiner, Ethics, National Sovereignty and the Control of Immigration, 30
INT’L MIGRATION REV. 171, 174 (1996).
58. Sharpless, supra note 12, at 28.
59. Id. at 22-23.
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affirms the concept of universal human dignity, which transcends
borders.60
Sharpless traces the origins of the theory we now call
cosmopolitanism to ancient Greek philosophers, the German
philosopher Immanuel Kant, and in more contemporary times
Martha Nussman—who “popularized a form of liberal
cosmopolitan political theory . . . in which she argued that people
have ‘moral obligations to the world.’”61 However, it is the political
theorist Seyla Benhabib that Sharpless draws from most
extensively. Benhabib recognizes the tensions between claims to
sovereignty (the right to exclude) and universal human dignity
(the argument for open borders) and ends up calling for
“increasingly porous, but not open borders.”62
Although Sharpless’ focus is not on asylum seekers per se (her
interest is in understanding the shifting family detention policies
under the Obama administration), her application of
cosmopolitanism to migration issues is welcome and illuminating.
If we are willing to accept the principle of universal human dignity,
then we have to query the morality of the walls, naval blockades,
and fictional borders (externalization) put in place in order to keep
desperate asylum seekers at bay. These exclusionary measures
may not technically violate the norm of non-refoulement, but at
their core, they are an abdication of commitment to the principle
of universal dignity and our human responsibility toward one
another.
Furthermore, if we accept the cosmopolitan belief that we
owe “allegiance . . . to the worldwide community of human
beings,”63 then how much greater is that moral responsibility when
we have contributed mightily to the conditions that cause people
to flee? Even scholars who reject the idea of a “more universal
moral obligation” 64 to those fleeing persecution have
acknowledged a greater responsibility when we have created
60. Id. at 24.
61. Id. at 22.
62. Id. at 23.
63. Id. at 23 (quoting Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR
LOVE OF COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM 4 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1997)).
64. David Steinbock, The Qualities of Mercy: Maximizing the Impact of U.S. Refugee
Resettlement, 36 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 951, 977 (2003).
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harmful situations. Among them is Michael Walzer, who spoke of
the obvious obligations that we have “to any group of people whom
we have helped turn into refugees.”65 Walzer had the Vietnamese
refugees in mind when he made this observation. 66 In
contemporary times, claims of heightened US responsibility to
Afghan refugees have been made, in light of the United States’
invasion of the country and its two-decade involvement there.67
The widely known and well understood role of the United
States in Vietnam and Afghanistan may make it easier for some to
accept the appeal to moral responsibility. In contrast, US
involvements in countries such as Haiti, Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Honduras—which are a major source of asylum seekers at our
southern border—may be less well known, making it more difficult
to lay claim to moral responsibility.68 This final section will attempt
to fill in that possible gap in knowledge and discuss the ways in
which US policies and interventions were major contributors to
the root causes of refugee flight from these countries today.
IV. THE UNITED STATES’ ROLE IN HAITI, GUATEMALA, EL
SALVADOR, AND HONDURAS
In describing his book Harvest of Empire,69 the award-winning
Latinex journalist Juan Gonzalez explains that Americans can only
understand the large Latino presence in the United States if they
understand America’s anti-democratic role in the region, thereby
seeing the resulting migration as the “harvest of empire.” 70 The
65. Id. at 978.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Luke Savage, America Has a Moral Obligation to Allow Afghan Refugees
In, JACOBIN (Aug. 20, 2021), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/08/moral-obligationafghan-refugees-afghanistan-war-biden [https://perma.cc/UC6B-5JHW].
68 . Sarah Sherman-Stokes discusses the US role in El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras, examines the “decades of prejudice” that have confronted asylum seekers from
these countries, and concludes that they are entitled to “reparation” in the form of
legislation that would “carve out special tailored protection.” See generally Sarah ShermanStokes, Reparations for Central American Refugees, 96 DENVER L. REV. 585 (2019).
69. JUAN GONZALEZ, HARVEST OF EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF LATINOS IN AMERICA 234 (2011).
70 . See Democracy Now!: “Harvest of Empire”: New Film Recounts How U.S.
Intervention Caused Mass Latin American Migrations (PBS television broadcast Sept. 25,
2012); see also GONZALEZ, supra note 69; Harvest of Empire: A History of Latinos in America
(Book), ZINN EDUC. PROJECT, https://www.zinnedproject.org/materials/harvest-of-empire
(last visited Mar. 14, 2022). In her article, Migration as Decolonization, Tendayi Achiume
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Uses of Haiti 71 by Paul Farmer, a renowned champion of global
health,72 strikes a similar note, detailing how US policies toward
Haiti have led to the conditions of extreme poverty and
governmental dysfunction that drive its citizens into exile. This
concluding Part highlights some of the most consequential and
harmful policies of the United States in each of the four countries.
A. Haiti
The relationship between the United States and Haiti goes
back to the 1800s. When enslaved black people in Haiti rose up
against their French colonizers, the United States supported the
colonists in their unsuccessful attempts to put down the
revolution.73 The Haitians prevailed, and the country became the
first free black republic in the hemisphere in 1804, as well as the
“first modern state” to abolish slavery. 74 This frightened the
Southern plantation owners who tried to keep their enslaved
individuals from learning of the revolution and advocated against
the US recognition of Haiti.75 It would not be until 1862, after the
South seceded from the Union, that the United States recognized
Haitian independence; 76 notably, it had imposed an economic
embargo against the country in the interval.77
takes the recognition of migration as the “harvest of empire,” one step further by arguing
for a new theory of sovereignty that “obligates former colonial powers to open their
borders to former colonial subjects.” Tendayi Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, 71
STAN. L. REV. 1509, 1510 (2019).
71. See generally PAUL FARMER, THE USES OF HAITI (2005).
72. See id. (About the Author); see also Remembering Dr. Paul Farmer, PARTNERS IN
HEALTH (Feb. 21, 2022), https://www.pih.org/article/remembering-dr-paul-farmer
[https://perma.cc/UY8Y-2Y2Y].
73. P.R. Lockhart, Trump is Ignoring One Huge Factor in the Current Status of Haiti: US
(Jan.
12,
2018),
https://www.vox.com/policy-andForeign
Policy,
VOX
politics/2018/1/12/16883224/trump-shithole-foreign-policy-haiti
[https://perma.cc/H5GC-HLDG].
74. Ann Crawford Roberts, A History of United States Policy Towards Haiti, MODERN
LATIN AMERICA: WEB SUPPLEMENT FOR 8TH EDITION (Thomas E. Skidmore et. al eds., 2013),
https://library.brown.edu/create/modernlatinamerica/chapters/chapter-14-theunited-states-and-latin-america/moments-in-u-s-latin-american-relations/a-history-ofunited-states-policy-towards-haiti/ [https://perma.cc/MAS4-HEM3] (last visited Apr. 19,
2022).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Lockhart, supra note 73.
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In 1915, during a period of political instability in Haiti in
which a number of presidents were assassinated or removed,
President Woodrow Wilson deployed the US Marines to Haiti. 78
They occupied Haiti until 1934 and were responsible for the deaths
of thousands of Haitians, 79 many of whom were killed with
extreme brutality.80 The United States confiscated money from the
Haitian National Bank and instituted a system of forced labor. 81
Rather than strengthening the country’s democracy, the United
States established Haiti’s armed forces, notorious for its long
record of involvement in coups and human rights violations.82
The United States’ ignominious role in Haiti did not end with
the occupation. The United States supported the dictatorship of
Francois Duvalier83 and his son Jean Claude Duvalier, under whose
reign “thousands of people were killed, tortured, arbitrarily
arrested, and disappeared.” 84 In 1990, Jean Bertrand Aristide, a
former priest and proponent of liberation theology, became the
first democratically elected president of Haiti. 85 He was
overthrown by the military in a coup in 1991. He returned to
power in 1994 to serve out the remainder of his term and was
78. Id. Reportedly the occupation was prompted by Citi Bank’s fears that Haiti could
not pay its debts. See Jeff Abbott, The Other Americans: U.S. Policy Is Deeply Implicated in
Haiti’s Crisis, PROGRESSIVE (July 28, 2021), https://progressive.org/latest/us-policyimplicated-in-haiti-crisis-abbott-210728/ [https://perma.cc/4ZSZ-7NE9].
79. Lockhart, supra note 73.
80 . Abbott, supra note 78 (“The early years of the occupation were met by an
insurgency led by Charlemagne Péralte, who was captured in 1919 and nailed to a door,
resembling a crucifixion, by U.S. Marines in a grotesque warning to the population.”); see
also David Suggs, The Long Legacy of the U.S. Occupation of Haiti, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2021/08/06/haiti-us-occupation-1915/
[https://perma.cc/T8QG-F8UR] (“U.S. forces executed political dissidents and
implemented a system of forced labor that ravaged Haiti’s peasant population … The
Haitian rebels who opposed the U.S. invasion were subjected to brutal repression.”).
81. Suggs, supra note 80.
82. See Roberts, supra note 74.
83. See Abbott, supra note 78.
84. Haiti: The Truth Must Not Die With Jean-Claude Duvalier, AMNESTY INT’L (Oct. 7,
2014), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/10/haiti-truth-must-not-diejean-claude-duvalier/ [https://perma.cc/9MDL-JVP2]; See also Factbox: Haiti's Aristide a
(Mar.
18,
2011),
Champion
of
Poor
Reviled
by
Elite,
REUTERS
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-aristide-factbox/factbox-haitis-aristide-achampion-of-poor-reviled-by-elite-idUSTRE72H67H20110318 [https://perma.cc/7CCM2HAC].
85. See Roberts, supra note 74.
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reelected in 2000, but in 2004 was once again forced from power.86
Although it is a matter of dispute, many believe that the United
States was behind the two coups.87
During the last decade, the United States has supported two
successive corrupt Haitian presidents, Michel Martelly 88 and
Jovenal Moise, who was assassinated on July 20, 2021.89 Martelly
surrounded himself with individuals accused of committing
serious crimes; he “empowered” them, establishing an
“environment of corruption, abuse of power, and impunity.”90 The
corruption included Martelly’s attempts to derail prosecutions by
pressuring prosecutors and judges not to proceed in cases against
his allies and friends.91
Jovenel Moise was Martelly’s hand-picked successor. 92
Corruption swirled around him as well, and he supported armed
gangs 93 to carry out his bidding. In 2019, government audits
revealed that his government had stolen millions of dollars from a
fund provided by the Venezuelan government to assist the poor;
this revelation led to major street protests.94 Throughout his time
in office, Moise tried to consolidate his power even further by

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Frances Robles, Haitian Leader’s Power Grows as Scandals Swirl, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/17/world/americas/haitian-presidenttightens-grip-as-scandal-engulfs-circle-of-friends.html [https://perma.cc/KN7D-JVS5].
89. See Abbott, supra note 78.
90. See Robles, supra note 88.
91. A judge who complained that Martelly had “meddled” in a corruption case against
Sophia Martelly, his wife, died several days later. See id.
SEC.,
https://tinyurl.com/2p9fed4h
92 . See
Jovenel
Moïse,
GLOB.
[https://perma.cc/4ZQH-2VVF] (last visited Mar. 14, 2022); Jovenel Moise: Haiti’s
JAZEERA
(July
7,
2021),
President
Assassinated
at
Age
53,
AL
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/7/jovenel-moise-haiti-presidentassassinated-at-age-53 [https://perma.cc/EHB7-APM5] (outlining Moise’s rise to power
and biography).
93. Monique Clesca, My Group Can Save Haiti. Biden is Standing in Our Way, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/01/opinion/haiti-commissiongovernment.html [https://perma.cc/6FF4-54RP].
94 . Merrit Kennedy, Protesters Demand Resignation of Haitian President Over
(June
11,
2019),
Corruption
Allegations,
NPR
https://www.npr.org/2019/06/11/731640235/protesters-demand-resignation-ofhaitian-president-over-corruption-allegations [https://perma.cc/XU5G-8E35].
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suspending the parliament 95 and attempting to change the
constitution so that he could run for two consecutive terms.96
There has yet to be a definitive answer as to who is
responsible for Moise’s assassination. But the pattern of US
interference meanwhile continues. Immediately after the killing of
Moise, the US Embassy tweeted its support for Ariel Henry to
become acting prime minister. 97 US officials did not engage
meaningfully with Haitian civil society organizations, such as the
broadly representative Commission to Search for a Haitian
Solution to the Crisis.98 Monique Clesca, one of its members, wrote
in a New York Times editorial99 that the Commission “can create a
free, secure, [and] democratic Haiti,” but it needs “the United States
and other nations to abandon the status quo.”100 The status quo to
which Clesca is referring is a history of their interference and belief
in the right to control the destiny of the Haitian people.
B. Guatemala
Guatemala has long been characterized by gross inequality in
its “distribution of resources and capital.” 101 Indigenous
Guatemalans, who make up a majority of the population, have been
95. See Abbott, supra note 78.
96. See Sarah Marsh, Exclusive: Haiti’s Moise Plans to Use New Powers to Overhaul
Constitution, REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-politicsexclusive/exclusive-haitis-moise-plans-to-use-new-powers-to-overhaul-constitutionidUSKBN1ZG0A5 [https://perma.cc/MG2Z-EHBF]; Marc Santora & Catherine Porter,
President of Haiti, Jovenel Moise, Assassination Updates: The President was Engaged in a
Sweeping Effort to Overhaul the Country’s Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/07/world/americas/jovenel-moise-death.html
[https://perma.cc/4SG2-3TFW]; Maria Abi-Habib, A Go-It-Alone President Wants to
(Mar.
25,
2021),
Reshape
Haiti.
Some
Are
Skeptical.,
N.Y. TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/25/world/americas/haiti-jovenel-moiseconstitution.html [https://perma.cc/9CPS-NUPA].
97. See Secretary Anthony Blinken (@SecBlinken), TWITTER (July 22, 2021, 2:08 PM),
https://twitter.com/secblinken/status/1418271690119843840
[https://perma.cc/V6HY-FQ6Y] (“Pleased to speak today with Haitian Prime Minister
Ariel Henry on how we can support Haiti in addressing their pressing challenges. The U.S.
is committed to working with Haiti’s government to respond to the Haitian people’s needs
and support Haiti’s democratic institutions.”).
98. See Clesca, supra note 93.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Guatemala Profile, INSIGHT CRIME (Feb. 28, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/bx8rh98x
[https://perma.cc/GA4U-KPGY].
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“systematically marginalized socially and politically since colonial
times.”102 Land ownership has been concentrated in the hands of a
few—in the mid-1900s, two percent of the population owned
seventy-two percent of the land. 103 United Fruit, an American
company, was a major land owner, and grew to have
overwhelming economic and political power in Guatemala. 104 It
enjoyed “unlimited use of much of the country’s best land,
complete access to Guatemala’s resources, exemption from nearly
all taxes and duties, and unlimited profit remittances.”105
Two democratically elected Guatemalan presidents Juan Jose
Arevalo and Jacobo Arbenz—elected in 1944 and 1950,
respectively—saw land reform as means of addressing the existing
gross societal inequalities. 106 Arevalo proposed a reform under
which only land not in cultivation would be taken and owners
would be compensated.107 Opposition was so strong that he was
unable to carry out this plan, but his successor, Arbenz, pushed
through the land reform that Arevalo had proposed.108 By way of a
decree, 500,000 peasants became the recipients of land
redistributed by the Guatemalan government. 109
Arbenz’s land reform drew the ire of the United Fruit
Company and the US government. The immediate response by the
US government was to cut off aid, but a plan was covertly put under
way to remove Arbenz.110 The ouster of Arbenz ushered in a long
period of repressive governments that maintained power through
unbridled violence.111 A thirty-six year civil war ensued, arising out
102. Id.
103. Billy Perrigo, The Devastating Effects of American Intervention in Guatemala,
19,
2015),
https://thepanoptic.co.uk/2016/11/19/americanPANOPTIC (Nov.
intervention-guatemala/ [https://perma.cc/MHR9-V465].
104. Karen Musalo & Eunice Lee, Seeking a Rational Approach to a Regional Refugee
Crisis: Lessons from the Summer 2014 ‘Surge’ of Central American Women and Children at
the US-Mexico Border, 5 JMHS 137, 153 (2017).
105. Id. at 153 n.20 (quoting Mark Gibney, United States’ Responsibility for Gross
Levels of Human Rights Violations in Guatemala from 1954 to 1996, 77 J. TRANSNAT’L L. &
POL. 77, 82 (1997)).
106. Perrigo, supra note 103.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Gibney, supra note 104, at 84.
111. Irma Alicia Velasquez Nimatuj, Guatemala Suffered for U.S. Foreign Policy, N.Y.
TIMES: THE OPINION PAGES – ROOM FOR DEBATE (May 19, 2013),
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of opposition to the repression and desire to transform “the
economic, social and political systems which had left the mostly
indigenous
population
impoverished
and
virtually
disenfranchised.”112
Throughout the war, the United States provided hundreds of
millions of dollars to the brutal Guatemalan government, which
committed massive human rights violations, 113 implementing a
scorched earth policy constituting genocide. The military burned
hundreds of indigenous villages to the ground, and between
200,000 to 250,000 Guatemalans either died or were disappeared.
Torture, rape, and sexual violence were pervasive.114
The civil war came to an end in 1996, but the peace process
did not resolve any of the underlying core problems.115 Guatemala
continues to suffer from high levels of poverty, violent crimes, and
inequality, with ongoing marginalization of the indigenous
population. 116 The country’s democratic institutions are plagued
by corruption at the highest levels.117 Successful efforts to address
corruption and impunity through the establishment of an
independent UN-backed commission 118 were brought to an end
when the work of the Commission threatened to uncover the
sitting president’s crimes. 119 Most recently, judges and
prosecutors previously involved with the now defunct
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/05/19/what-guilt-does-the-us-bearin-guatemala/guatemala-suffered-for-us-foreignpolicy#:~:text=The%20inequalities%20that%20led%20to,exclusion%2C%20contempt
%20and%20structural%20racism [https://perma.cc/746F-B5T6].
112. Musalo & Lee, supra note 104, at 153; Timeline: Guatemala’s Brutal Civil War,
PBS NEWS HOUR (Mar. 7, 2011), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/latin_americajan-june11-timeline_03-07 [https://perma.cc/76GG-MY3B].
113. Musalo & Lee, supra note 104, at 153.
114. Id.
115. See Guatemala Profile, supra note 101101.
116. MAUREEN TAFT-MORALES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42580, GUATEMALA: POLITICAL AND
SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND U.S. RELATIONS 1 (2019).
117. Id. at 2-3.
118. The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (La Comisión
Internaciónal Contra la Impunidad - CICIG) was “created in 2007 in response to advocacy
by Guatemalan civil society organizations who feared that government complicity with
organized crime networks would imperil Guatemala’s consolidation of democracy
following the 1996 peace agreement.” Musalo, El Salvador: Root Causes, supra note 29 at
208 n.138.
119. See Guatemala Profile, supra note 101101.
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commission, or working with a special anti-impunity prosecutors
office,120 have been wrongfully accused of crimes, and arrested, in
an attempt to silence and intimidate them.121
To what degree is the United States responsible for the
current conditions that exist in Guatemala today? As I have written
in a prior reflection on this question:
[I] do not purport to draw a straight line of causation between
[U.S.] interventions and current conditions of violence,
inequality, and social exclusion that prevail in Guatemala.
However, there is no doubt that US actions caused untold
suffering and setbacks to the struggle for justice and
democracy; one can only speculate what Guatemala would be
like today if the US government had not forced Arbenz out of
office or supported the repressive Guatemalan military during
the country’s civil war.122

On a trip to Guatemala in 1999, President Clinton apologized
for the US support for the country’s brutal military in its thirty-sixyear-long civil war. 123 He made the statement a month after an
independent Guatemalan truth commission released a report
attributing the “vast majority of human rights abuses during the
war, including torture, kidnapping and the murder of thousands of
rural Mayans” to the US-backed security forces.124
Notably, Clinton’s statement did not include any reference to
the US intervention in 1954, which brought an abrupt end to
Arbenz’s presidency and his promise of land reform. But of even
greater significance within the context of this Article is that
Clinton’s apology was not accompanied by any proposals—modest
or grand—to make right by the Guatemalan people. In fact, in that
120. See id101.
121. European Union External Action Service Press Release 220211_13, Guatemala:
Statement by the Spokesperson on the Rule of Law Situation (Feb. 11, 2022).
122. Musalo & Lee, supra note 112, at 154.
123. John M. Broder, Clinton Offers His Apologies to Guatemala, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11,
1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/11/world/clinton-offers-his-apologies-toguatemala.html [https://perma.cc/68RQ-7Q8X].
124. Charles Babington, Clinton: Support for Guatemala was Wrong, WASH. POST (Mar.
11,
1999),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/inatl/daily/march99/clinton11.htm [https://perma.cc/6U37-X55J]; Guatemala —
Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification: Conclusions and
Recommendations
(Feb.
1999),
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23778631.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A019d81f84e85f
727bf2277a639f00b27&ab_segments=&origin= [https://perma.cc/UDN9-TCTF].
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same trip he rejected a request from the region’s leaders—
including Guatemala’s—to “cease or slow [the] deportation” of
undocumented citizens from their countries. This raises the
question that has run throughout this Article: what moral
responsibility do we owe to the people and nations we have
harmed?
C. El Salvador
Although unique in some respects, the history of El Salvador
is not dissimilar from that of Guatemala. After the Spanish
conquest, indigenous Salvadorans were forced off their
communally owned lands, property ownership became
concentrated in the hands of monied interests, and state
repression was deployed to maintain these deep inequalities. 125
Organizing against exploitative conditions was met with
unrestrained violence; seared into the memory of Salvadorans is
the 1932 Matanza (Massacre), during which the country’s National
Guard slaughtered around thirty thousand, mostly indigenous
coffee plantation workers who had gone on strike to demand
better living and working conditions.126
In the 1970s, in response to the defeat of modest land reform
efforts and electoral fraud, civil society groups began organizing.127
The Catholic teachings of liberation theology, which validated the
rights of the poor and oppressed to ask for justice, were an
influential force. 128 The movement of popular organizations—
peasants, students, and unions—was met with state repression.129
Unable to make progress through non-violent popular
organizing, groups fighting for economic and societal equality took
up arms.130 The response of the Salvadoran state was brutal and
did not distinguish between armed combatants and unarmed
125. Karen Musalo, El Salvador– A Peace Worse than War: Violence, Gender and a
Failed Legal Response, 30 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 3, 8-9 (2018), [hereinafter Musalo, El
Salvador–A Peace Worse than War].
126. Jan. 22, 1932: La Matanza (“The Massacre”) Begins in El Salvador, ZINN EDUCATION
PROJECT,
https://www.zinnedproject.org/news/tdih/la-matanza
[https://perma.cc/8PH4-JDRC] (last visited Apr. 19, 2022).
127. Musalo, El Salvador–A Peace Worse than War, supra note 125, at 10.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Musalo, El Salvador: Root Causes, supra note 29, at 185.
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civilians who simply supported the cause. The military carried out
massacres resulting in the deaths of thousands of peasants; priests
and nuns were targeted and killed, and torture and disappearances
were commonplace.131
Even though it had knowledge of the pervasive and gross
atrocities being carried out by the Salvadoran security forces, the
United States provided a high level of funding. During the Reagan
administration, the United States was “dumping more than a
million dollars a day of military aid into El Salvador.”132 By the end
of the conflict, the United States had provided more than $5 billion
in assistance.133
El Salvador’s civil war lasted from 1980 to 1992. An estimated
75,000 people were killed, 500,000 were displaced, and many
others were disappeared. 134 The war came to an end with the
signing of peace accords in 1992. 135 The economic inequalities
which had brought about the conflict were not addressed, amnesty
laws provided impunity for those who had committed human
rights violations, 136 and a significant number of former military
and guerrilla combatants held on to their weapons and ultimately
incorporated themselves into criminal enterprises.137
In addition to the harm inflicted by its funding of the brutal
military, the United States was not a positive force in the aftermath
of the conflict. It pressured the Salvadoran government to adopt
neoliberal economic policies which deepened poverty and societal
marginalization.138 Harsh immigration laws led to the deportation
of Salvadoran youths who had fled the civil war and gotten
involved with gangs in the United States. They became the seeds of
the well-established gangs that have grown and have become a
131. Musalo, El Salvador–A Peace Worse than War, supra note 125, at 10.
132. Nelson Rauda & John Washington, The U.S. Role in the El Mozote Massacre Echoes
POST
(May
12,
2021),
in
Today’s
Immigration,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/05/13/us-role-el-mozote-massacrestill-echoes-immigration-today/ [https://perma.cc/B4ED-HGNP].
133. Musalo, El Salvador–A Peace Worse than War, supra note 1255, at 5.
134. Id. at 4-5.
135. Id. at 13.
136. Id.
137. El Salvador Profile, INSIGHT CRIME (Sept. 15, 2020), https://insightcrime.org/elsalvador-organized-crime-news/el-salvador/ [https://perma.cc/Z95H-MBH6].
138. Musalo, El Salvador–A Peace Worse than War, supra note 125, at 24.
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major source of the high levels of violence in El Salvador today.139
As with Haiti and Guatemala, the United States should
acknowledge its contributions to the conditions of violence and
inequality which persist in El Salvador, and accept the concomitant
moral obligations that accompany such recognition.
D. Honduras
Many of the same patterns which characterize the historical
relationship between the United States and Guatemala are
repeated in Honduras. Beginning in the 1890s, US banana
companies began setting up their operations, possessing nearly
one million acres of prime land in Honduras by 1914. 140 These
companies owned so much of the best lands that Honduran
peasants “had no hope of access to their nation’s good soil.” 141
None of the money generated from the banana plantations
benefited the Honduran people, but was taken out of the
country. 142 American companies also controlled Honduras’
banking and mining sectors.143 The United States was so protective
of its interests that it engaged in “political and military inventions”
in 1907 and 1911 to secure them.144
The United States continued to wield significant influence
over political and military matters in Honduras, resulting in the
country being disparagingly referred to as the “U.S.S. Honduras”
and the “Pentagon Republic.”145 During the Reagan presidency, the
United States used Honduras as a launchpad for its interventionist
efforts in both Nicaragua and El Salvador.146 In Nicaragua, Reagan’s
goal was to overthrow the leftist Sandinista government, and in El

139. CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43616, EL SALVADOR: BACKGROUND AND
U.S. RELATIONS 7 (2020).
140. Joseph Nevins, How U.S. Policy in Honduras Set the Stage for Today’s Migration,
CONVERSATION (Oct. 31, 2016), https://theconversation.com/how-us-policy-in-hondurasset-the-stage-for-todays-migration-65935 [https://perma.cc/VS2F-KCKM].
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34027, HONDURAS: BACKGROUND AND U.S.
RELATIONS, 12 (2020).
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Salvador, it was to support the brutal Salvadoran military.147 The
Honduran military was handsomely rewarded for its role, with a
tenfold increase in funding during the Reagan administration.148
The building up of the military was at the expense of democratic
institutions and civil society, 149 and was especially troubling
because of the military’s involvement in both human rights abuses
and drug trafficking.150
During the 1980s, international drug trafficking got its
foothold in Honduras with the establishment of routes between
Colombia and Mexico to transport cocaine to the United States.151
High-level political actors have been implicated in drug
trafficking, 152 including the former president Juan Orlando
Hernandez, who was recently arrested on drug charges.
Hernandez’s brother is also currently serving a life sentence in the
United States for drug trafficking.153
Due to the activities of drug cartels and street gangs,
Honduras has one of the highest homicide rates in the world.154 It
is also one of the poorest countries in Latin America, with almost
half the population living below the poverty level and more than a
third living in conditions where they cannot meet their “basic
nutritional needs.” 155 Corruption is rampant with public officials
embezzling millions.156 An anti-corruption initiative backed by the
Organization of American States—the Mission to Support the Fight
against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras—was having some
success in investigating and prosecuting high-level cases, but its

147. Id.
148 . Philip L. Shepherd, The Tragic Course and Consequences of U.S. Policy in
Honduras, 2 WORLD POL’Y J. 109, 116 (1984).
149. Id. at 135.
150. Jose Miguel Cruz, Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America: The
Survival of the Violent State, 53 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 1, 17-18 (2011).
151. Honduras Profile, INSIGHT CRIME (Feb. 15, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/46a6pwtr
[https://perma.cc/QG29-MFGR].
152. MEYER, supra note 146, at 5-6, 10.
153. Juan Orlando Hernández: Police Arrest Honduran Ex-leader on Drugs Charges,
BBC (Feb. 15, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-60387156
[https://perma.cc/HW38-C53W].
154. MEYER, supra note 146, at 12.
155. Id. at 8.
156. Id. at 5.
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continued operation was opposed by the Honduran Congress and
was shut down by the then-president Hernandez.157
Discontent with the levels of violence, corruption, and
economic insecurity led to the 2005 election of Manuel Zelaya, who
campaigned on a platform of raising the minimum wage and
combatting crimes that plagued the country. 158 Once in office,
Zelaya began instituting promised reforms: “[u]nder his
leadership, Honduras raised the minimum wage by 60 percent,
offered subsidies to small farmers, and lowered interest rates.”159
These and other actions he took, such as the prohibition of open pit
mining, angered conservatives and business interests both inside
and outside the country.160
Zelaya was ousted in a military coup, prompted by his calls for
a referendum to decide whether a vote should take place during
the upcoming general election on a constitutional amendment.161
The amendment would have permitted him to stand for
reelection. 162 The international community viewed the coup as
unlawful and illegitimate.163 The Organization of American States
(“OAS”) issued an “ultimatum” to restore Zelaya to office.164 Joining
the OAS in condemnation of the coup was the European Union,165
the United Nations, 166 the World Bank, and the International
Monetary Fund. 167 The United States initially opposed the coup
157. Id. at 5-6.
158. See Nevins, supra note 140; Honduras Profile, supra note 151.
159. Dancing with Monsters: The U.S. Response to the 2009 Honduran Coup, HARV. POL.
REV.
(Apr.
13,
2015),
https://harvardpolitics.com/us-honduran-coup/
[https://perma.cc/EX26-V56K] [hereinafter Dancing with Monsters].
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Honduras Profile, supra note 1511.
163. Thomas Legler, Learning the Hard Way: Defending Democracy in Honduras, 65
INT’L J. 601, 605-06 (2010).
164. Id. at 605; see also Jim Wolf, OAS Suspends Honduras Over Coup Against Zelaya,
REUTERS (July 4, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-40812020090705
[https://perma.cc/JM3F-62JB].
165. EU to Warn Honduras of Further Sanctions Over Coup, REUTERS (Sept. 10, 2009),
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-honduras/eu-to-warn-honduras-of-furthersanctions-over-coup-idUKTRE58948520090910 [https://perma.cc/S8YD-FFXW].
166 . Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly, Acting Unanimously,
Condemns Coup d’État in Honduras, Demands Immediate, Unconditional Restoration of
President, U.N. Press Release GA/10842 (June 30, 2009).
167. Legler, supra note 163, at 605-06.
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and joined other inter-governmental organizations and countries
in imposing sanctions. 168 However, influential business
interests,169 as well as Republican senators were highly supportive
of the de facto post-coup government. 170 The senators took a
number of actions to reduce the “international isolation” of
Honduras, and to put pressure on the Obama administration, 171
including holding up votes on Obama appointments for highranking diplomatic positions. 172 They also heavily lobbied
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The United States, which had
stated it would not recognize the results of a Honduran election if
Zelaya was not returned to office, 173 changed its position and
stated it would—a position seen as “legitimating the post-coup
government.” 174 The change in the US position “had a divisive
effect” on the international consensus not to recognize an election
held after Zelaya’s unlawful removal from office, and ultimately the
election was recognized by a “critical mass of countries.”175
In accepting the ouster of Manuel Zelaya, the United States
was repeating the pattern that has characterized its relationship
with the other three countries discussed in this Part and many
more outside the scope of this piece. It has “incited, encouraged,
and supported coups” 176 when they served US priorities of
“preserv[ing] the free market and protect[ing] American corporate
interests” 177 and it has tolerated corrupt and repressive
governments when their policies were aligned with US interests.
These truths are hard to deny in light of the historical facts. And if
168. Id; see also Dancing with Monsters, supra note 159 (“[T]he United States took
diplomatic and economic measures [against the coup-led government].”); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-9R, REVIEW OF U.S. RESPONSE TO THE HONDURAN POLITICAL
CRISIS OF 2009 2 (2011). This included the termination of a number of “security, economic,
and development assistance programs in Honduras.” Id.; see also Jake Johnston, How
Pentagon Officials May Have Encouraged a 2009 Coup in Honduras, INTERCEPT (Aug. 29,
2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/08/29/honduras-coup-us-defense-departmetntcenter-hemispheric-defense-studies-chds/ [https://perma.cc/KP6F-QP4J].
169. Dancing with Monsters, supra note 159.
170. Legler, supra note 163, at 615-16. See also Dancing with Monsters, supra note
159.
171. Legler, supra note 163, at 615-16.
172. Id. at 616; see also Dancing with Monsters, supra note 159.
173. Legler, supra note 163, at 616.
174. Nevins, supra note 140.
175. Legler, supra note 163, at 616.
176. Dancing with Monsters, supra note 159.
177. Id.
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we acknowledge that the United States has wielded its
considerable military and economic strengths to further its own
agenda at the expense of the rights and dignity of the citizens of
other countries, then can we continue to deny a moral obligation
to those who live with the consequences?
V. CONCLUSION
Non-refoulement—the prohibition of returning a refugee to
persecution—is the core obligation that the 1951 Convention and
its 1967 Protocol imposes on state parties. Regrettably, the
violation of the norm of non-refoulement has become so common
in the global north that it risks becoming normalized. The
consequences are not simply abstract but result in the suffering or
deaths of those in the direst of circumstances. This Article argues
that we must not tolerate the normalization of practices which
return refugees to harm. Beyond the clear legal obligation that
prohibits such action are the moral and ethical considerations
arising from both religious and secular systems of thought.
A country’s ethical obligations should be seen to be greater
when it has caused or contributed to the conditions which cause
individuals to flee. I use the examples of Haiti, Guatemala, El
Salvador, and Honduras as illustrative of situations where US
interventions indisputably caused harm.
Discussions of asylum protection for nationals from these four
countries and others where the United States has intervened
detrimentally would benefit from an acknowledgement of the role
the United States has played over centuries in each one of them,
accompanied by a change in policy. And although extending
protection now does not undo the harm wrought in the past, it
would constitute a long-overdue form of reparations.178

178. See generally Sherman-Stokes, supra note 68.
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